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COALITIONS AND CLIQUES IN THE SCHOOL CHOICE PROBLEM

arXiv:1104.5474v2 [math.OC] 26 Jul 2011

S. AKSOY, A. AZZAM, C. COPPERSMITH, J. GLASS, G. KARAALI, X. ZHAO, AND X. ZHU
Abstract. The school choice mechanism design problem focuses on assignment mechanisms matching students to public schools in a given school district. The well-known Gale Shapley Student Optimal Stable Matching Mechanism (SOSM) is the most efficient stable mechanism proposed so far
as a solution to this problem. However its inefficiency is well-documented; recently the Efficiency
Adjusted Deferred Acceptance Mechanism (EADAM) was proposed as a remedy for this weakness.
This note introduces two related adjustments to SOSM in order to address the same inefficiency
issue. In one we create possibly artificial coalitions among students where some students modify
their preference profiles in order to improve the outcome for some other students. Our second
approach involves trading cliques among students where those involved improve their assignments
by waiving some of their priorities. The coalition method yields the EADAM outcome as well as
other Pareto dominations of the SOSM outcome, while the clique method yields all possible Pareto
optimal Pareto dominations of SOSM. The clique method furthermore incorporates a natural solution to the problem of breaking possible ties within preference and priority profiles. We discuss
the practical implications and limitations of our approach in the final section of the article.

1. Introduction
Since the mid-eighties, in cities across the United States, public school assignment policies have
shifted towards providing students the opportunity to influence their school assignment. The main
objective of these school choice policies is to allow all students to attend more desirable schools.
A standard theoretical framework for studying such policies is two-sided matching (cf. [14, 23]).
Presented in this context, the goal of the School Choice Problem (SCP) is to devise a matching
mechanism (designed by or for the school district) that allocates available resources (seats in schools)
among players (students or parents) subject to district priorities and legal requirements.
The ideal way to solve the SCP would be to make all schools desirable to sufficiently many students
so that all students could attend schools high on their preference profile. Short of a magic wand,
we follow in the footsteps of other researchers in our attempt to create the most desirable matching
possible given the seemingly intractable problem of too few seats in desirable schools. Current
school choice mechanisms tolerate a large number of students receiving low preference schools
(“inefficiency”) in order to respect school priority structures (“stability”). The ultimate purpose of
these priorities is to benefit the students, but in many practical situations they are also the direct
cause of the efficiency losses. This suggests that taking a stable solution as baseline (starting out
with a balanced focus on school priorities and student preferences) and then making improvements
for efficiency (emphasizing preferences over priorities at the expense of stability) may be a good
compromise incorporating both preferences and priorities, resulting in more desirable matchings.1
Date: July 25, 2011.
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A relevant quote from [4]: “Pareto efficiency for the students is the primary welfare goal, but [...] stability of the
matching, and strategy-proofness in the elicitation of student preferences, are incentive constraints that likely have
to be met for the system to produce substantial welfare gains over the [current] system.”
1

To this end we employ the language and methods of mechanism design as applied to the SCP
a la [2]. In our context the designer/principal is the school district (or whoever is choosing the
mechanism to be used). Students are the players; schools are merely items to be consumed, though
the end result is influenced by the priorities defined by the district. The designer’s desired outcome
is that all students get matched to a school high on their preference lists. Thus the underlying
sentiment in our research coincides with that found in previous research in the SCP: the idea that
the process should result in as many students as possible receiving placements at schools as high on
their preference list as possible in a given matching. School districts may of course have additional
motives when designing their policies, which might include, among other things, diversity and social
justice considerations; these can to an extent be incorporated in the school priority structures.
In this article we examine several commonly applied mechanisms in two sided matching and school
choice. We introduce two related approaches and examine how these new approaches measure up.
In Section §§1.2 we introduce three standard mechanisms used in this area of investigation: SOSM2,
EADAM, and TTC. In §2 we introduce our first new approach by studying the impact on outcomes if
students were to form “coalitions” in order to affect their school assignments. This section closely
follows [15] where it is shown that while the Gale-Shapley deferred acceptance algorithm (DA)
disincentivizes strategic action by individuals, it is still feasible for groups to beat the system by
coming together and strategizing. We adapt Huang’s methods to the SCP and along the way
prove that SOSM (DA as applied to School Choice) is not coalition-strategyproof. We then show
that coalitions created by the school district (or any designer/principal) could result in efficiency
gains over the DA/SOSM outcome. We find that this approach produces many possible Pareto
improvements to the DA/SOSM outcome and, in particular, will yield the Efficiency Adjusted
Deferred Acceptance Mechanism (EADAM) outcome as one of its outcomes.3
Following up on the coalition/cooperation theme, in §3 we focus on groups of students who
form trading cycles (“cliques”) to improve their own assignments.4 We examine the impact of
these trading cliques when starting with the baseline assignment that results from the DA/SOSM
mechanism. In particular we show that the coalition improvements of §2 can be integrated into this
new framework, which proves to be a powerful construct to study cycle improvements of various
kinds. We also note that indifferences in student preferences may be incorporated into this model.
Although a considerable amount of research has been done regarding indifferences within school
priority classes, indifference in student preferences has not been studied in as much depth. As far
as we know, this characteristic of cycle improvement models has not been investigated before.
Interwoven throughout this work is our emphasis on student preferences as opposed to school
priorities, that is, efficiency as opposed to stability. This is due to our wariness of accepting the
cost of upholding priorities at expense to the students they are purported to help. We also note that
to run the standard algorithms, strict priority rankings are needed. While priorities vary between
districts, a single priority class will often have a large number of students. Thus to apply standard
two-sided matching algorithms to the SCP, one must ultimately break ties randomly among students
within a single priority class. This creates arbitrary rankings, introduces artificial conditions, and
results in a sizable efficiency loss (see [11] for a study of tie-breaking and its efficiency cost). Both
collaborative approaches presented (coalitions and cliques) make efficiency adjustments to a stable
baseline solution which we see as a feasible way to partially address this tie-breaking conundrum
as well as the more standard stability-efficiency tradeoff mentioned earlier.

2

Since SOSM basically uses a particular type of deferred acceptance (DA) procedure applied to the SCP, in §§1.2,
we also describe the DA algorithm briefly.
3
All acronyms in this paragraph will be explained in detail in §§1.2.
4
The term clique has a specific meaning in graph theory, unrelated to our work here.
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1.1. Notation and basic terms used. Let I denote a nonempty set of students, and S a
/ I × S is a function that associates every stunonempty set of schools. A matching M : I
dent with exactly one school, or potentially no school at all. Write M for the set of matchings. We
will also use the related function M : I → S and write M [i] = s if M (i) = (i, s).
A preference profile Pi for student i ∈ I is a tuple (S1 , . . . , Sn ) where the Sj ’s form a partition
of S and every element of Sj is preferred to every element of Sk if and only if j < k. Define the
ranking function ϕi : S → N of a student i ∈ I by letting ϕi (s) denote i’s ranking of s ∈ S. In
other words ϕi (s) = j if s ∈ Sj . When each Sj is a singleton, we say that i’s preference profile is
strict, (in which case we can view Pi as an n-vector). If sk , sl ∈ Sj for some j, k 6= l, then we say
that the student is indifferent between sk and sl . If i prefers sk to sl , we write sk ≻i sl , or simply
sk ≻ sl if i is unambiguous. Note that the notation ≻ denotes a strict order; if we want to describe
a weak order, we will write . We denote a set consisting of preference profiles for each student in
I by P = {Pi : i ∈ I} and the space of all such sets is denoted by P.
A priority structure Πs for school s ∈ S is a tuple (I1 , . . . , In ) where the Ij ’s form a partition
of I and every element of Ij is preferred to every element of Ik if and only if j < k. When each
Ij is a singleton, we say that s’s priority structure is strict, (in which case we can view Πs as an
n-vector). If ik , il ∈ Ij for some j, k 6= l, then we say that the school is indifferent between ik and
il . If s prefers ik to il we write ik ≻s il , or simply ik ≻ il if s is unambiguous. Once again, the
notation ≻ denotes a strict order; if we want to describe a weak order, we will write . We denote
a set consisting of priority structures for each school in S by Π = {Πs : s ∈ S} and the space of all
such complete sets is denoted by .
A matching M ′ (Pareto) dominates M if M ′ [i] i M [i] for all i and M ′ [j] ≻j M [j] is strict for
some j. A (Pareto) efficient matching is a matching that is not (Pareto) dominated.
/ M is a function that takes an ordered pair (P, Π) ∈ P × 
A matching mechanism M : P × 
of preferences and priorities and produces a matching.
Let Πs be a priority structure for school s. We say that a matching M violates the priority of
i ∈ I for s if there exist some j ∈ I and s′ ∈ S such that
(1) M [j] = s, M [i] = s′ : j gets assigned s under M and i gets assigned s′ under M .
(2) s ≻i s′ : i prefers attending s over s′ and
(3) i ≻s j: s prioritizes i over j.
We say that a matching M is stable if
(1) M does not violate any priorities.
(2) No student is matched to a lower-ranked school when a more preferred school is unfilled.
A stable mechanism is one that always produces stable matchings. A matching mechanism is
strategyproof if there is no rational incentive for a student to misrepresent their preferences.
1.2. Background. In this section we introduce several well-known matching algorithms / mechanisms and give a few illustrative examples.5 In the literature on two-sided matching the GaleShapley deferred acceptance algorithm [13] is highly touted, see [23] for an extensive review of the
various applications of this algorithm and [21] for a more recent historical overview. Gale and Shapley first described their deferred acceptance method in the context of the stable-marriage problem:
There are two distinct groups (men and women) each with an individual preference profile ranking
the members of the opposite sex; the ultimate goal is to find a stable matching between the men
and the women.6 The deferred acceptance procedure (DA) is as follows:
5We should remark that all the mechanisms described in this section use strict preference lists for students.
6In this context stability means that no man will prefer a woman other than his own partner who also prefers him

more than the man to whom she was matched.
3

In round 1 each man proposes to his top choice. Each woman then tentatively accepts the man
who is highest on her preference list among those who proposed to her that round (who is now her
fiance) and rejects the rest. In step k, each unengaged man proposes to his next choice, and each
woman considers her new suitors along with her current fiance, tentatively accepting her top choice
among them, and rejecting the rest. The algorithm ends when all men are engaged.
In [13], Gale and Shapley proposed applying their deferred acceptance algorithm to the college
admissions problem, with the men replaced by students applying to colleges and the women replaced
by the colleges to which they applied. In 2003 Abdulkadiroǧlu and Sömnez adapted the GaleShapley algorithm to the SCP [2] calling it the Student Optimal Stable Mechanism (SOSM). The
Gale-Shapley deferred acceptance algorithm, as adapted to the SCP in the form of SOSM, is widely
held to be a practical mechanism for implementation. In particular, several large districts such as
New York City and Boston [3, 4, 5, 6] have adopted SOSM as their mechanism of choice. Pareto
efficiency, stability, and strategyproofness are the main criteria used to evaluate a school choice
matching mechanism,7 and within these measures, SOSM performs well. Indeed, SOSM offers a
stable strategyproof mechanism whose outcomes Pareto dominate all other stable matchings.8
In this article we use DA/SOSM as a baseline to improve upon. Indeed certain improvements are
possible, feasible, and desirable because SOSM suffers from documented efficiency and welfare losses
[4, 17]. More precisely, although the SOSM outcome in a given setting dominates any other stable
matching, it can often be dominated by an unstable matching. We now illustrate this potential
trade-off between stability and efficiency with an example due to Roth, which we will label as
SCP1 . Assume there are three schools, s1 , s2 , s3 and three students i1 , i2 , i3 . The priorities of the
schools and the preferences of the students are given by:
SCP1 :

i1 : s2 ≻ s1 ≻ s3
i2 : s1 ≻ s2 ≻ s3
i3 : s1 ≻ s2 ≻ s3

s1 : i1 ≻ i3 ≻ i2
s2 : i2 ≻ i1 ≻ i3
s3 : i2 ≻ i1 ≻ i3

where a ≻ b stands for “a is preferable to b” (more about notation and terminology can be found
in §§1.1). Here, the only stable matching is:


i1 i2 i3
SCP1
MS
=
,
s1 s2 s3
but this matching is (Pareto) dominated by:
MESCP1

=




i1 i2 i3
.
s2 s1 s3

We see that MESCP1 (Pareto) dominates MSSCP1 because it assigns i1 and i2 schools they prefer over
their MSSCP1 assignment. Furthermore MESCP1 is (Pareto) efficient. However the matching is no
longer stable because i2 is in the position of violating i3 ’s priority for s1 .
In order, in part, to address the weakness illustrated by the example above, Kesten in [17] proposes
a new mechanism, and calls it the Efficiency Adjusted Deferred Acceptance Mechanism (EADAM).
In order to understand EADAM we must first define an interrupter. Let student i be one who
is tentatively placed in a school s at some step t while running the SOSM, and rejected from it at
some later step t′ . If there exists at least one other student who is rejected from school s after step
7We will add a fourth criterion to our consideration, see §§1.3
8Note that a stable mechanism can never really be strategy-proof in the complete sense. More specifically, no

stable matching mechanism exists for which stating the true preferences is always a best response for every agent where
all other agents state their true preferences (see for instance [23, Cor. 4.5]). However the DA/SOSM is practically
strategy-proof as we only view the students as strategic players and the student optimality implies that there is no
incentive for the students to misrepresent their preferences (cf. [20]). This perspective does not take into account
manipulation by schools in capacity (cf. [25]) or preferences, see [10] for recent work addressing these issues.
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t − 1 and before step t′ , then we call student i an interrupter for school s and the pair (i, s) is an
interrupting pair of step t′ . An interrupter is consenting if she allows the mechanism to violate
her priorities at no expense to her. The EADAM then runs as follows:
• Round 0: Run the SOSM.
• Round 1: Find the last step (of the SOSM run in Round 0) at which a consenting interrupter
is rejected from the school for which he/she is an interrupter. Identify all interrupting pairs
in that step which contain a consenting interrupter. If there are no such pairs, then stop.
Otherwise for each identified interrupting pair (i, s), remove school s from the preference
list of student i without changing the relative order of the remaining schools. Rerun the
SOSM with the new preference profile for i until all students have been assigned.
And in general,
• Round k, k ≥ 1: Find the last step (of the SOSM run in the previous round) at which a
consenting interrupter is rejected from the school for which he/she is an interrupter. Identify
all interrupting pairs in that step which contain a consenting interrupter. If there is no such
pair, stop. Otherwise for each identified interrupting pair (i, s), remove school s from the
preference list of student i without changing the relative order of the remaining schools.
Rerun the SOSM with the new preference profile until all students have been assigned.
In SCP1 , (i3 , s1 ) is an interrupting pair and the EADAM with the consent of i3 outputs the Pareto
efficient matching MESCP1 .
Even though the end result of consenting for interrupters is that they allow the mechanism to
violate their priorities for schools they would not be assigned anyway, the step-by-step description
above points toward a different route of obtaining the same outcome. The practical outcome would
be the same if the consenting interrupters were to modify their preference lists in such a way as to
drop schools that they’d not have been assigned to anyway. Thus instead of asking students to sign
consent forms to waive priorities, as would be required to run the EADAM, we could in theory ask
them to reconsider their preference lists.9
Last, we describe the Top Trading Cycles (TTC) mechanism, first introduced in [24] (also see
[1, 18]) and adapted to the school choice context in [2] as an alternative to SOSM. TTC is a strategyproof mechanism that compromises on stability to achieve efficiency, and proceeds as follows:
• Round 1: Each student points to his or her first choice school. Similarly each school points
to its first choice applicant. Since there are finitely many students and schools, there is at
least one cycle. For each such cycle do the following: Assign each student in the cycle to
the school he or she is pointing to and remove the student and the school from the market.
All unassigned students and unfilled schools move on to the next round.
And in general,
• Round k, k ≥ 1: Each unassigned student points to his or her top choice school among
the unfilled ones. Each unfilled school points to the student whom it ranks highest among
the unassigned students. There should be at least one cycle. For each such cycle do the
following: Assign each student in the cycle to the school he or she is pointing to and remove
the student and the school from the market. All unassigned students and unfilled schools
move on to the next round. The algorithm runs until all students have been assigned.
Thus in essence, once in a trading cycle, students are allowed to trade schools among themselves.
1.3. A new evaluation criterion. The three main criteria most commonly used to evaluate school
choice mechanisms are stability, strategyproofness and (Pareto) efficiency. In [7] we introduced a
new student-optimal criterion, a “preference reverence index ”, and showed that it incorporates
a measure of student optimality that is not fully captured by these three previously emphasized
9In reality this is not desirable; we emphatically want students to be truthful in declaring their preferences.
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criteria. When evaluating matching outcomes in the later parts of this article we make use of this
index, so we provide a brief exposition about it in this section.
/ N by
With the notation from §§1.1 we define µ : M
X
µ(M ) =
|ϕi (M [i]) − 1|.
i∈I

For any given M ∈ M we will call µ(M ) the preference reverence index of M or simply the
preference index. We summarize some results regarding the preference index in the following:
Proposition 1.1. The following are some properties and implications of the preference reverence
index as applied to the SCP:
(1) There can exist two stable matchings with the same preference index.
(2) The stable matching with the smallest preference index is the SOSM outcome and it is the
unique stable matching with that preference index.
(3) If a matching M (Pareto) dominates M ′ , then M has a lower preference index.
See [7] for more on the preference reverence index.
2. Coalitions in the school choice problem
In [15] Huang discusses a weakness found in the Gale-Shapley stable matching in the context of
the stable marriage problem and introduces the idea of coalition cheating in the marriage problem.
More specifically he shows that a coalition can be formed where some men, without forgoing their
own Gale-Shapley stable matching assignment, can cheat (misrepresent their preferences) so that
some other men marry women who are higher on their preference list.
In this section we apply these ideas to the school choice problem. In §§2.1 we give the details
of Huang’s construction. Then in §§2.2 we introduce the elements of cheating coalitions in the
context of the SCP, and discuss some implementation issues. In §§2.3 we focus on some interesting
theoretical consequences of coalitions in the context of the SCP. In §§2.4 and §§2.5, we compare
the possible outcomes of coalitions to that of EADAM, and to that of TTC, respectively.
2.1. Huang’s Construction and Coalitions. Originally proved in [8], the following theorem
establishes that in the stable marriage problem, there exists no coalition of men that may falsify
their preferences such that every member of the coalition receives a strictly better assignment:
Theorem 2.1 (Dubins-Freedman 1981). In the Gale-Shapley men-optimal algorithm, no subset of
men can improve their assignment by falsifying their preference lists.
Therefore in order to study coalitions which falsify preferences to improve their assignments,
Huang introduces a nuanced notion of coalitions, which incorporates a separation between two main
components: those who falsify their preferences, and those that benefit from these falsifications. In
the following we provide a detailed exposition of his construction.
Let Men and Wom be the set of men and women respectively in a given stable marriage problem.
Let M be the Gale-Shapley stable matching assignment for this problem when all members of Men
and Wom submit their true preferences. A coalition C is defined in terms of a pair (K, A) of subsets
of the set Men. The first subset, the cabal K = (m1 , m2 , ..., m|K| ) of the coalition C, is a list of
men such that each man mi , 1 ≤ i ≤ |K|, prefers M [mi−1 ] to his own partner M [mi ], indices taken
module |K|. In other words, we have M [mi−1 ] ≻mi M [mi ] for 1 ≤ i ≤ |K|, what we will call a
cabal loop, written (m1 → m|K| → m|K|−1 → · · · → m1 ), a closed chain of men each of whom
would prefer the stable partner of the person before him to his own partner. The second subset,
the accomplice set A = A(K) of cabal K, is a set of men A(K) ⊂ Men such that m ∈ A(K) if
for some mi ∈ K, M [mi ] ≻m M [m] and m ≻M [mi ] mi+1 . In other words, an accomplice is a man
6

who in his truthful preference list ranks the stable partner of someone in the cabal higher than his
own stable partner, while he himself is ranked higher by that woman than the next member of the
cabal who would prefer her to his own partner. Note that K and A(K) may or may not be disjoint.
For any given man m ∈ Men we can write the preference profile of m as a disjoint union of three
sets: (PL [m], M [m], PR [m]). Here the set PL [m] (respectively PR [m]) is simply the list of women
on m’s preference profile to the left (respectively to the right) of his stable partner M [m].
Let C = (K, A(K)) be a coalition as described above and let πr denote a random permutation
of Wom. The coalition cheating procedure proceeds as follows ([15, Thm.2]): Each accomplice
m ∈ A(K) submits a falsified list of the form
(πr (PL [m] − X), M [m], πr (PR [m] ∪ X)).
Here X is the set
{w ∈ M [K]|w = M [mi ], w ≻m M [m], m ≻w mi+1 }
if m 6∈ K, and
X = {w ∈ M [K]|w = M [mi ], i 6= j, w ≻mj M [mj ], mj ≻w mi+1 },
if m = mj ∈ A(K) ∩ K. In other words, accomplices modify their preference profiles by moving
women on the left of their stable partner to the right of their stable partner if they are desirable
to other men in the cabal. In particular if m is an accomplice, then the set X of women m moves
to the right of his stable partner will consist of all the stable partners of members of the cabal
who rank m higher than the man following their stable partners in the cabal loop. Huang then
shows that in the resulting matching M ′ , M ′ [mi ] = M [mi−1 ] for mi ∈ K and M ′ [m] = M [m] for
m 6∈ K. Note that in the above the falsified preference lists incorporate a random permutation πr
of the preferences to the left and the right of the stable partner. The cheating coalition procedure
is quite robust, in that such a random permutation will not affect the outcome. In other words,
the resulting matching creates a cyclical reassignment of those within the cabal loop while leaving
all other assignments as they were.
2.2. Coalitions and school choice. Here is an analogue of Theorem 2.1 in the SCP context:
Theorem 2.2. In the SOSM algorithm, no subset of students can improve their assignment by
falsifying their preference lists.
This is particularly easy to see in our previous example. Assume there are three schools, s1 , s2 , s3
and three students i1 , i2 , i3 . The school priorities and the student preferences are given by:
i1 : s2 ≻ s1 ≻ s3
s1 : i1 ≻ i3 ≻ i2
i2 : s1 ≻ s2 ≻ s3
s2 : i2 ≻ i1 ≻ i3
i3 : s1 ≻ s2 ≻ s3
s3 : i2 ≻ i1 ≻ i3
Recall that the SOSM yields the (unique stable) matching


i1 i2 i3
SCP1
MS
=
,
s1 s2 s3
SCP1 :

Each non-singleton, nonempty subset of the set of students corresponds to a valid coalition:
c1 = {i1 , i2 } c2 = {i1 , i3 } c3 = {i2 , i3 } c4 = {i1 , i2 , i3 }
For coalition c1 , the only way for both students to improve their lot is for i1 to receive s2 and
i2 to receive s1 . However, unless i3 receives a better assignment with this coalition, the resultant
matching will be unstable since i2 violates i3 ’s priority at s2 . So i3 must receive a better school if
i1 or i2 have a chance of receiving a better assignment, so i3 must receive s1 or s2 . Thus clearly i1
and i2 cannot both strictly benefit. The arguments for the remaining coalitions are similar.
7

The underlying intuition for the above result is much clearer than brute force computation. For a
coalition of students to benefit from their falsification under SOSM, either their interests conflict, or
the constraint of stability requires appeasing other students not in the coalition, and this conflicts
with the interests of those in the coalition. For a deeper and more enlightening discussion, see [8].
With this example and motivating theorem in mind, we now proceed to formalize our coalition
model for the SCP, which we will call the Coalitional Improvement Mechanism (CIM).
Let I and S be the set of students and schools respectively in a given SCP. Let M be the
SOSM stable matching assignment for the case where all students submit their true preferences.
A coalition C is defined in terms of a pair (K, A) of subsets of the set I of students. The first
subset, the cabal K = (i1 , i2 , ..., i|K| ) of a coalition C, is a list of students such that each student
ik , 1 ≤ k ≤ |K|, prefers M [ik−1 ] to M [ik ], indices taken modulo |K|. In other words, we have
M [ik−1 ] ≻ik M [ik ] for 1 ≤ k ≤ |K|, and a cabal loop, written (i1 → i|K| → i|K|−1 → · · · → i1 ),
a closed chain of students each of whom would prefer the stable assignment of the person before
him to his own stable assignment. The second subset, the accomplice set A = A(K) of cabal
K = (i1 , i2 , ..., i|K| ), is a set of students A(K) ⊂ I such that i ∈ A(K) if for some ik ∈ K,
M [ik ] ≻i M [i] and i ≻M [ik ] ik+1 . In other words, an accomplice is a student who in his truthful
preference list ranks the stable assignment of someone in the cabal higher than his own stable
assignment, while he himself is ranked higher by that school than the next member of the cabal
who would prefer it to his own school. Note that K and A(K) may or may not be disjoint.
For any student i ∈ I we can write the preference profile of i as a disjoint union of three sets:
(PL [i], M [i], PR [i]). Here the set PL [i] (respectively PR [i]) is simply the list of schools on i’s preference profile to the left (respectively to the right) of his stable assignment M [i]. Let πr denote a
random permutation of S. The coalition cheating procedure (CIM) is described in:
Theorem 2.3 (cf. Huang 2006 [15]). Let M be the SOSM matching for a given SCP when students submit their true preferences. Consider a coalition C = (K, A(K)), and suppose that each
accomplice i ∈ A(K) submits a falsified list of the form (πr (PL [i] − X), M [i], πr (PR [i] ∪ X)), where
• if i 6∈ K, then X = {s ∈ M [K]|s = M [ik ], s ≻i M [i], i ≻s ik+1 }, and
• if i = ik ∈ A(K) ∩ K, X = {s ∈ M [K]|s = M [ij ], j 6= k, s ≻ik M [ik ], ik ≻s ij+1 }.
Then in the resulting matching M ′ , M ′ [ik ] = M [ik−1 ] for ik ∈ K and M ′ [i] = M [i] for i 6∈ K.
The proof of Theorem 2.3 is an easy adaptation from the analogous result of Huang [15].
Accomplices modify their preference profiles by moving schools on the left of their stable assignment to the right of their stable assignment if they are desirable to other students in the cabal. In
particular if i is an accomplice, then the set X of schools i moves to the right of his stable assignment will consist of all the stable assignments of the members of the cabal that rank i higher than
the student following their stable assignment in the cabal loop. Again, this procedure is robust,
i.e., a random permutation of the two sides of the stable assignment will not affect the outcome.
Let us now consider an example which we will label SCP2 . Let I = {i1 , i2 , i3 , i4 , i5 } and S =
{s1 , s2 , s3 , s4 , s5 } be the set of students and schools, respectively, and let their respective preference
and priority profiles be given as follows:

SCP2 :

i1
i2
i3
i4
i5

: s2
: s2
: s5
: s4
: s5

≻ s5
≻ s5
≻ s2
≻ s1
≻ s4

≻ s4
≻ s4
≻ s1
≻ s2
≻ s2

≻ s3
≻ s1
≻ s3
≻ s3
≻ s3

≻ s1
≻ s3
≻ s4
≻ s5
≻ s1
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s1
s2
s3
s4
s5

: i3
: i4
: i2
: i1
: i1

≻ i2
≻ i5
≻ i3
≻ i2
≻ i2

≻ i4
≻ i1
≻ i4
≻ i3
≻ i5

≻ i1
≻ i2
≻ i5
≻ i5
≻ i3

≻ i5
≻ i3
≻ i1
≻ i4
≻ i4

Note that the matching output by the SOSM for SCP2 is:


i1 i2 i3 i4 i5
SCP2
=
MS
s5 s4 s1 s2 s3
and has preference reverence index 10 (§§1.3).
We now consider the following coalition C = (K, A(K)): Let K = {i1 , i2 , i4 } with the cabal loop
(i1 → i4 → i2 → i1 ). The accomplice set A(K) is {i5 } and the set X for i5 is {s2 , s4 }. In other
words the only student who modifies his preference profile is i5 . We display his old and new profiles:
i5 ’s old profile : s5 ≻ s4 ≻ s2 ≻ s3 ≻ s1
i5 ’s new profile : s5 ≻ s3 ≻ s1 ≻ s2 ≻ s4
[We underlined i5 ’s stable assignment s3 .] The outcome matching when we rerun SOSM is:


i1 i2 i3 i4 i5
SCP2
MC
=
s2 s5 s1 s4 s3
which improves the outcome for all members of the cabal, does not affect the remaining students,
and has preference index 6.10 We will discuss this example further in §§3.1.
2.3. Selfless and hopeless students. In the example above, student i5 modified his preference
profile in order to change the group outcome to MCSCP2 from MSSCP2 , but in the end, he did not
improve his own assignment. In fact, in any coalition the accomplice set will include some students
who do not benefit from the coalition. To understand why, we go back once again to the stable
marriage problem. In that context, Dubins and Freedman [8] showed that it is impossible for
every man in a coalition to improve his assignment. In other words a subset of men cannot falsify
their preference lists so that all of them get better partners. Thus in Huang’s coalition cheating
framework, in order to improve the assignments of some members of the cabal, there have to be
some selfless men who are willing to make adjustments to their preference profiles despite the
fact that they themselves cannot benefit from the arrangement. Analogously in the SCP context,
for cheating coalitions to work, there have to be selfless students who are willing to adjust their
preferences even though this will not improve their assignment. It should be noted that in these
cases, the selfless participant does not end up with a less desirable assignment.
This situation raises the question of the feasibility of coalition cheating, as we now see that some
members of the accomplice set have no obvious incentive to make the required adjustments to
their preference profiles. As a possible resolution to this issue, Huang [15] proposes a randomized
strategy in which every man can expect to marry women ranked higher on their preference lists.
This strategy requires men to take risks, since some men can end up with less desirable partners.
In the School Choice Problem however, students and parents are relatively risk-averse. Thus a
coalition agreeing to a randomized arrangement like the one mentioned by Huang in the Stable
Marriage Problem is not rationally practical in the SCP. Moreover, in school districts where there
may be many students competing against each other for a limited number of seats at desirable
schools, cooperation among parents and students is not plausible.
Nonetheless we propose that our work does not merely present a theoretical framework to investigate collaboration and cooperation issues in the context of the SCP, but in fact it can have
implementable outcomes in this context. More specifically, we propose that a school district, given
perfect information of all student preferences, can create “artificial coalitions” that would result in
a more efficient outcome than that of SOSM. Using the SOSM matching as a baseline, a computer
program could identify all matchings that would result from all possible coalitions.11 It would then
10We note that this is also the EADAM outcome if i consents.
5
11However, arguably, the computer power needed for this could be quite large.
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be up to the district to decide which coalitions would be most appropriate to further its own district
goals. For instance one district could select the coalition(s) which results in the matching with the
most Pareto improvements on the SOSM outcome, while another might choose the coalition(s)
based on minimizing the preference index, and yet another could count the number of priority
violations (the matching with fewer priority violations being more “fair”) or weight the magnitude
of the various priority violations (in terms of the priority level of the violator(s)).
We have already pointed out that in order for coalitions to work, there have to be some accomplices
willing to modify their preferences despite the fact that they themselves will not benefit. While
some of these accomplices might benefit from different coalitions, others, it turns out, have no hope
of ever benefiting from any coalition. Huang calls these hopeless men in the context of the stable
marriage problem, and proves that there always exists at least one hopeless man for any given set
of preference profiles. We now consider the analogous construct for the School Choice Problem:
Definition 2.4. Given a specific SCP, a student who cannot benefit from any Pareto improvement
upon SOSM is said to be hopeless.
It turns out that there is always such a hopeless student. In other words, we have:
Theorem 2.5. There is always at least one hopeless student when Pareto improvements are made
on SOSM. More specifically, in EADAM or CIM, there is always at least one hopeless student.
In fact this follows directly from a stronger result:
Theorem 2.6. The students who propose in the last round of SOSM are hopeless.
Proof. Let I be the set of all students and S be the set of all schools. Label the set of schools
that get proposals in the last step of SOSM as SL = {s1 , s2 , . . . , sm } and the set of students that
propose in the last step as IL = {i1 , i2 , . . . , in }. If a student ij ∈ IL proposes to sj ∈ SL in the
last step of SOSM, then we can conclude that prior to that step, sj had not yet filled its capacity.
Otherwise ij would be replacing another student at sj and thus forcing that student to propose in
a next round, which would in turn mean that the algorithm could not stop.
Assume now that ij ∈ IL is not hopeless. This means that he can improve his lot via some
Pareto improvement. Let us denote the set of ALL students who are moved with this improvement
IP = {ij , i′ , i′′ , ...i(n) }. If any of these students preferred vacant seats to their assigned seats at the
end of SOSM we would have a contradiction; they should have included or ranked those schools
higher on their preference lists. Thus the Pareto improvement must move all these students to
seats that have been assigned under SOSM. Thus the improvement in fact should correspond to
a permutation of IP , and by the pigeonhole principle there exists another student i∗ that prefers
sj to her original assignment school s∗ . (It doesn’t matter if s∗ is from SL or not. Similarly i∗
may or may not belong to IL ). Since in SOSM students propose to schools in the order that they
rank them on their preference lists, i∗ must have applied to sj , been rejected, then applied to s∗ .
This would imply that school sj must have filled its capacity before the last step of SOSM, which
contradicts our assumption that ij was accepted by sj in the last step of SOSM: no filled school
can receive and accept a proposal in the final step of SOSM because that would result in a student
being displaced which would require another step in the mechanism.

Looking now back at SCP1 we see that i3 is a hopeless student. In other words, i3 will not benefit
from any Pareto improvement to the SOSM matching. Similarly in SCP2 , the last proposer in the
SOSM is i5 who is thus a hopeless student.
2.4. Coalitions and EADAM. The SOSM has already been implemented in several school districts due to its desirable properties of strategyproofness and stability and the fact that it generates
the most (Pareto) efficient assignment among all stable matchings. However, as has already been
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mentioned (and documented in [4, 17] and elsewhere) its strict adherence to a stable outcome
(emphasizing priorities) can result in substantial inefficiency. In this section we compare two
efficiency-oriented modifications to SOSM, namely the EADAM from [17] (described in §§1.2) and
the coalition cheating SOSM improvement.
The main result of this section is:
Theorem 2.7. There exists a coalition improvement on SOSM yielding the EADAM outcome with
full consent.
More generally we will prove
Theorem 2.8. For any possible combination of consenters, the associated EADAM outcome may
be obtained by forming an appropriately designed coalition that improves on SOSM.
The intuition behind this is that “accomplices” can be viewed as interrupters who consent to
waive their priority so that they do not start a rejection chain. By each accomplice waiving his
priority - those on the rejection chain are given the opportunity to be accepted into better schools
on their lists without violating the priorities of the accomplices.
Proof of Theorem 2.8. Let I and S be the sets of students and schools, respectively. Let (P, Π)
be a given school choice problem for the pair (I, S), and let W be the set of students who consent
to waiving their priorities under the EADAM mechanism. Denote by MS and ME the SOSM and
the EADAM outcome matchings of this problem, respectively. We will now construct a coalition C
which will result in the same outcome ME . First define the cabal set K to be the set of all students
whose assignments are different under MS and ME :
K = {i ∈ I : MS [i] 6= ME [i]}.
These are the students who benefit from the EADAM; they will also be the students who will
benefit from the coalition C. Since every student whose assignment changes under EADAM is in
K, we can partition K into cabal loops. This is equivalent to the basic algebraic fact that any finite
permutation can be written as the product of disjoint cycles. Hence an elementary algorithm to
decompose K into its individual cabal loops can be described as follows:
• Step 0: Define a permutation πK of K by setting πK (i′ ) = i (i′ points to i) if MS [i] = ME [i′ ].
In words, i′ points to i if EADAM matches i′ to the school that SOSM matches i.
• Step 1: Pick a student i ∈ K and label her i1,1 . Then let i1,2 be the student πK (i1,1 ) and
more generally label i1,j+1 = πK (i1,j ). This process will stop at some j1 with πK (i1,j1 ) = i1,1
as πK is a finite permutation. Then K1 = (i1,1 → i1,2 → · · · → i1,j1 → i1,1 ) is a cabal loop.
And in general,
• Step k, k ≥ 1: Pick a student i ∈ K who has not yet been assigned to a cabal loop and
label her ik,1 . If none exists then the algorithm stops. Otherwise, label πK (ik,1 ) as ik,2 and
more generally label ik,j+1 = πK (ik,j ). This process stops at some jk with πK (ik,jk ) = ik,1
as πK is finite. Then Kk = (ik,1 → ik,2 → · · · → ik,jk → ik,1 ) is a cabal loop.
Note that the algorithm has to stop because K is finite. Furthermore each student in K shows up
in exactly one round and hence in exactly one cabal loop, because πK is invertible.
Next we describe how to form the accomplice set A(K). A student i will be in A(K) if and only
if the following two conditions are both satisfied:
• i ∈ W , or equivalently, i consents to waive her priorities in the EADAM; and
• There is a school s such that (i, s) is a last interrupter pair at some round of EADAM.
The new preference profile for an accomplice i ∈ A(K) will be of the form
(PL [i] − X, MS [i], PR [i] ∪ X),
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where
• if i 6∈ K, then X = {s ∈ MS [K]|s = MS [ik ], s ≻i MS [i], i ≻s ik+1 }, and
• if i = ik ∈ A(K) ∩ K, X = {s ∈ MS [K]|s = MS [ij ], j 6= k, s ≻ik MS [ik ], ik ≻s ij+1 }.
Here we are using the notation of §§2.2 where PL [i] (respectively PR [i]) is the list of schools on i’s
preference profile to the left (respectively to the right) of his stable assignment MS [i].
Finally Theorem 2.3 allows us to conclude that the outcome matching MC of C = (K, A(K)) will
be as follows: MC [i] = MS [i] for all i 6∈ K, and MC [ik ] = MS [ik+1 ] for ik , ik+1 in some cabal loop
Kj in K. But then MC = ME and we are done.

In order to see the analogy between accomplices and interruptors, we analyze a minor modification
of SCP2 from §§2.2 which we label SCP3 : Let I = {i1 , i2 , i3 , i4 , i5 } and S = {s1 , s2 , s3 , s4 , s5 } be
given with the following preference and priority structures, respectively:

SCP3 :

i1
i2
i3
i4
i5

: s1
: s2
: s5
: s4
: s5

≻ s2
≻ s5
≻ s2
≻ s1
≻ s4

≻ s5
≻ s4
≻ s1
≻ s2
≻ s2

≻ s4
≻ s1
≻ s3
≻ s3
≻ s3

≻ s3
≻ s3
≻ s4
≻ s5
≻ s1

s1
s2
s3
s4
s5

: i3
: i4
: i2
: i1
: i1

≻ i2
≻ i5
≻ i3
≻ i2
≻ i2

≻ i4
≻ i1
≻ i4
≻ i3
≻ i5

≻ i1
≻ i2
≻ i5
≻ i5
≻ i3

≻ i5
≻ i3
≻ i1
≻ i4
≻ i4

We now run the SOSM algorithm for SCP3 (this is also Round 1 for EADAM assuming full consent):
Round 1
Step 1
Step 2
Step 3
Step 4
Step 5
Step 6
Step 7
Step 8
Step 9
Step 10
Step 11
Step 12

s1
i1

s2
i2
i2 , i3

s3

s4
i4

s5
i3 , i5

i3 , i1
i1 , i2
i2 , i5
i4 , i5
i3 , i4
i1 , i4
i1 , i2
i2 , i5
i4 , i5
i5

The SOSM outcome is:
MSSCP3

=




i1 i2 i3 i4 i5
.
s5 s4 s1 s2 s3

Note that student i1 is an interrupter for s2 (causes s2 to reject i2 in step 4 and is rejected herself
by s2 when i4 comes along, in step 8.) Student i2 is an interrupter for s2 (causes s2 to reject i3 in
step 2 and is rejected herself by s2 when i1 comes along, in step 4.) Student i5 is an interrupter
for s4 (causes s4 to reject i4 in step 6 and is rejected herself by s4 when i2 comes along, in step
10.) Student i5 is an interrupter for s5 (causes s5 to reject i3 in step 1 and is rejected herself by s5
when i2 comes along, in step 5.) Student i2 is an interrupter for s5 (causes s5 to reject i5 in step 5
and is rejected herself by s5 when i1 comes along, in step 9.) Thus {i5 , s4 } is the last interrupter
pair. We remove s4 from i5 ’s preference list.12
12In each round of EADAM, there may be multiple interrupter pairs. However, only the LATEST interrupter pair

is used for the next round. For example, in Round 1, there are 5 interrupter pairs, but we only remove the latest
interrupter pair {i5 , s4 }.
12

Round 2
Step 1
Step 2
Step 3
Step 4
Step 5
Step 6
Step 7
Step 8
Step 9
Step 10
Step 11

s1
i1

s2
i2
i2 , i3

s3

s4
i4

s5
i3 , i5

i3 , i1
i1 , i2
i2 , i5
i1 , i5
i1 , i2
i2 , i4
i3 , i4
i4 , i5
i5

The outcome is the same in Round 2. The pair {i5 , s2 } is the last interrupter pair. We remove s2
from i5 ’s preference list.
Round 3
Step 1
Step 2
Step 3
Step 4
Step 5
Step 6

s1
i1

s2
i2
i2 , i3

s3

s4
i4

s5
i3 , i5

i3 , i1
i1 , i2
i2 , i5
i5

The outcome is different in Round 3; i1 , i2 and i4 ’s assignments have changed. This time {i5 , s5 }
is the last interrupter pair. We remove s5 from i5 ’s preference list.
Round 3
Step 1

s1
i1

s2
i2

s3
i5

s4
i4

s5
i3

The last round (Round 4) takes only one step; everybody gets matched with his or her first choice.
(Of course i5 has had to make adjustments to his profile multiple times; his new first choice was in
fact his fourth truthful choice.) Thus EADAM with full consent13 returns the following matching:


i1 i2 i3 i4 i5
SCP3
ME
=
.
s1 s2 s5 s4 s3
Can we find a coalition that will output this same outcome? Indeed yes! The cabal will be the set
{i1 , i2 , i3 , i4 } and the singleton accomplice will be {i5 }. The set X for i5 will be X = {s2 , s4 , s5 }.
Note that there are two cabal loops: (i1 → i3 → i1 ) and (i2 → i4 → i2 ).
Note that the coalition we create (and equivalently the EADAM with full consent) in this problem
corresponds to a drastic improvement in the preference index. The preference index of this outcome
is 3 while the preference index of the original SOSM outcome was 11.
There are indeed other coalitions that could be used for the same SCP. Take for instance the cabal
to be {i2 , i4 } and let {i5 } to be the singleton accomplice set. Then X = {s2 , s4 } and we get:


i i i i i
MCSCP3 = 1 2 3 4 5 .
s5 s2 s1 s4 s3
The preference index for this matching is 7. Thus it is still an improvement by this measure on
the SOSM, but the larger cabal of the previous example (which is equivalent to EADAM with
i5 ’s consent) is more optimal with respect to reducing the preference index. On the other hand it
may be interesting to observe that this outcome cannot be obtained via EADAM no matter which
students consent. This is due to the fact that once i5 consents to waive his priorities, he has to
13In fact we only used the consent of i .
5
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consent fully. In other words, any other Pareto improvement involving the interrupter pairs he was
a part of will also be made. This in particular implies that the converse of Theorem 2.8 is not true.
Looking more closely at SCP3 , we notice that in practice what we have done amounts to changing
the preferences for i5 to i5 : s3 ≻ s4 ≻ s2 ≻ s5 ≻ s1 ; this way we were able to give i1 , i2 , i3 , i4 their
first choice without making i5 worse off. However, we can alternatively change the preferences for
i3 and give i1 , i2 , i4 , i5 their first choice and i3 her 4th choice which is essentially the same matching
(also with preference index 3!) except that i3 is worse off now than in the SOSM matching.
Student i5 seems to be set to lose out from the beginning, even in the SOSM matching. We may
ask whether this is due to the fact that i5 , unlike i3 , is not highly prioritized at any school, and
how the fact that i5 is a hopeless student relates to this situation. The crucial point is that the
matching obtained via the coalition formed by changing i5 ’s preferences, and including everyone
else in the cabal, or equivalently the EADAM outcome, (Pareto) dominates the original SOSM,
while the matching obtained when i3 is made to change his preference list does not. Changing
i3 ’s preferences would be more objectionable than changing i5 ’s preferences because the associated
matching indeed harms somebody when compared to their stable assignment under SOSM, which
is viewed as a baseline assigning an initial endowment to each student.
2.5. Another efficiency oriented mechanism: TTC and coalitions. We now look for a relationship between the Top Trading Cycles mechanism and SOSM with the coalition efficiency
improvement. When we incorporate coalitions into the SOSM, we alter preferences so that some
students have improved placements and no students have worse placements (relative to their standard assignments under SOSM). We now seek to understand if we can mimic the outcome of TTC
via some coalition/preference manipulation of SOSM.
We begin with an example in which the TTC and SOSM find two different matchings, yet a
coalition can be formed so that SOSM with this coalition results in the same matching as the TTC.
Let us look once again at SCP1 from §1: There are three schools, s1 , s2 , s3 , three students i1 , i2 , i3 ,
and only one seat at each school. Student preferences and school priorities are given by:
SCP1 :

i1 : s2 ≻ s1 ≻ s3
i2 : s1 ≻ s2 ≻ s3
i3 : s1 ≻ s2 ≻ s3

s1 : i1 ≻ i3 ≻ i2
s2 : i2 ≻ i1 ≻ i3
s3 : i2 ≻ i1 ≻ i3

Here, the SOSM finds the matching (of preference index 4):


i i i
MSSCP1 = 1 2 3 .
s1 s2 s3
The TTC finds a matching that (Pareto) dominates MSSCP1 (and has preference index 2):14


i i i
MTSCP1 = 1 2 3 .
s2 s1 s3
If i3 modifies her preference list such that s3 is her first choice, then each student has a distinct
first choice. Then SOSM assigns all their first choice, which yields the same matching as the TTC
output for the original setup. The relevant coalition is given by K = {i1 , i2 } and A(K) = {i3 }.
Similarly if we run the TTC algorithm on SCP2 , we see that the outcome is the same as that
obtained when we use the coalition with the cabal K = {i1 , i2 , i4 } (the cabal loop is (i1 → i4 →
i2 → i1 )), the accomplice set A(K) = {i5 }, and the set X = {s2 , s4 } for i5 . In other words the TTC
outcome is equivalent to the coalition-adjusted outcome of SOSM with i5 being the only person
who needs to modify her preference profile (§§2.2, also see §§3.1).
With these examples as background we now prove:
14Recall that this is the same as the EADAM outcome in the case of full consent: M SCP1 = M SCP1 .
T
E
14

Theorem 2.9. One cannot always obtain the TTC outcome by coalition adjustments to SOSM.
Proof. We construct a counterexample. We modify SCP1 slightly and call the new setup SCP4 .
Assume there are three schools, s1 , s2 , s3 , three students i1 , i2 , i3 , and there are two seats at s2 and
one seat each at s1 and s3 . School priorities and student preferences are as in SCP1 :
i1 : s2 ≻ s1 ≻ s3
i2 : s1 ≻ s2 ≻ s3
i3 : s1 ≻ s2 ≻ s3

SCP4 :

s1 : i1 ≻ i3 ≻ i2
s2 : i2 ≻ i1 ≻ i3
s3 : i2 ≻ i1 ≻ i3

Here the SOSM matching is:
MSSCP4

=




i1 i2 i3
,
s2 s2 s1

and it has preference index 1.
If we run the TTC for SCP4 , we find one cycle in the first round: i1 points to s2 , s2 points to i2 ,
i2 points to s1 , and s1 points back to i1 . We assign these students as desired. In the next round, i3
is the only student left, and the unfilled schools are s2 and s3 . i3 points to s2 and s2 points back.
This is a cycle, so we assign i3 to s2 . Thus, our final matching is:


i i i
MTSCP4 = 1 2 3 ,
s2 s1 s2
which also has preference index 1.
The two matchings are Pareto incomparable. As coalition improvements are Pareto improvements,
it is impossible to design a coalition so that the SOSM finds the same matching as the TTC.15 
In the example above the SOSM outcome was efficient. However, there are cases when the SOSM
outcome is not efficient, where the TTC outcome is Pareto incomparable and so cannot be obtained
via a coalition improvement. Consider for instance the following school choice problem we label
SCP5 : Let I = {i1 , i2 , i3 , i4 } and S = {s1 , s2 , s3 , s4 }, and assume that each school has only one
seat. School priorities and student preferences are given as follows:
SCP5 :

i1
i2
i3
i4

: s1
: s1
: s2
: s4

≻ s3
≻ s2
≻ s1
≻ s3

≻ s2
≻ s3
≻ s3
≻ s2

≻ s4
≻ s4
≻ s4
≻ s1

s1
s2
s3
s4

: i4
: i2
: i2
: i1

≻ i3
≻ i3
≻ i3
≻ i2

≻ i1
≻ i1
≻ i1
≻ i3

≻ i2
≻ i4
≻ i4
≻ i4

If we run both mechanisms, we see that the respective assignments are:




i1 i2 i3 i4
i1 i2 i3 i4
SCP5
SCP5
MS
=
MT
=
s3 s2 s1 s4
s1 s2 s3 s4
with preference indices both equaling 3. Looking at the two assignments, we see that the matching
under SOSM is not efficient, and TTC and SOSM are not Pareto comparable. 16
The above discussion allows us to conclude that in case the TTC outcome dominates the SOSM
outcome, we can obtain the same outcome via an appropriate choice of coalitions (e.g. SCP1 ).
However when the TTC outcome is Pareto incomparable to the SOSM outcome (e.g. SCP4 , SCP5 ),
it is impossible to obtain the same outcome via a coalition adjustment. More generally we can prove:
Theorem 2.10. The outcome of a mechanism that is Pareto incomparable to SOSM cannot be
obtained by a coalition adjustment to SOSM.
15In this particular problem, the SOSM performs undeniably better against the criteria we use to evaluate out-

comes. Its outcome has low preference index, is stable and efficient, while the TTC outcome is not stable.
16An efficient Pareto improvement of M SCP5 with preference index 1 can be obtained via EADAM with the
S
consent of i1 , or equivalently, via a coalition with K = {i2 , i3 }, A(K) = {i1 }, and X = {s1 } for i1 .
15

This follows from the fact that coalition adjustments result in Pareto improvements.
3. Trading Cliques for school choice
EADAM and CIM provide us with ways to systematically improve upon the SOSM matching.
However, both mechanisms involve complicated procedures. For the EADAM, we need to identify
interruptors in a backward order one by one and run the SOSM algorithm over and over again. For
CIM, we need to form various coalitions and identify falsified preference orders that will work for
each. However the ultimate goal in either case is the same: to Pareto improve upon SOSM while
being able to justify the resulting priority violation(s).
In this section we propose another way to improve upon the SOSM matching. Although there will
be priority violations in the final matching (since SOSM Pareto dominates all stable matchings),
we justify these violations by noting that nobody is made worse off in their re-assignment when
compared to their SOSM assignment. School priorities are respected by the SOSM matching, so
there is also a baseline reverence to these constraints, though they are deemphasized in later stages.
The main idea is as follows: We begin by applying SOSM to the given student preferences and
school priorities. Next with no further consideration of school priorities, we enter students into
a trading market. In other words, the SOSM assignment is the starting point for the next phase
of the assignment process after which priorities are ignored. For the second round, the goal is to
improve school assignments from the point of view of student preferences as much as is possible.
In §§3.1, we describe in more detail our new mechanism, the Trading Adjusted Deferred Acceptance
Mechanism (TADAM). We investigate the basic properties of TADAM and compare the outcome of
TADAM with those of other standard mechanisms in §§3.2. In particular we discuss how coalitions
and cliques relate to one another and to other mechanisms involving cycle improvements. We also
comment on the implications for the school choice context.
3.1. Description of the Trading Adjusted Deferred Acceptance Mechanism. We now
develop a systematic way to find all Pareto improvements upon a predetermined matching M in
a given SCP. We start by associating a directed weighted graph (V, E, w) to M as follows: Each
student i is assigned a unique vertex vi in V . There is an edge from vertex vi to vertex vj if student
i desires student j’s assignment under the given matching at least as much as, if not more than,
the school to which he himself was assigned. An edge e from vertex vi to vertex vj has weight
w(e) = 0 if student i desires student j’s assignment under the given matching as much as, but not
more than, the school to which he himself was assigned, and w(e) = 1 if the preference is strict.
In the above we can identify V with the set of students. With this in mind we now introduce:
Definition 3.1. Let I and S be a set of n students and a set of m schools, respectively, with
respective preference and priority structures (P, Π). Let M be a matching for the associated SCP.
We say that the directed weighted graph GM = (V, E, w) is the (directed weighted) graph of
the matching M if V = I; for any pair of students (i, j), there is an edge eij from i to j if and only
if M [j] i M [i]; and for each edge eij ∈ E, w(eij ) = 0 if M [i] i M [j], and w(eij ) = 1 otherwise.
Using this terminology, we can make the following:
Definition 3.2. (cf. [12, Defn. 1]) Let I, S, (P, Π), M and GM be given as in Defn. 3.1 and let
k ∈ N. A trading clique of length k (or simply a clique) consists of a sequence (i1 , i2 , · · · , ik )
of k distinct students such that for each s < k, there is an edge in E from vis to vis+1 , there is an
edge in E connecting vik back to vi1 , and either for some s < k, w(eis ,is+1 ) = 1 or w(eik ,i1 ) = 1. A
similar cycle where w = 0 on all edges is called a null clique. A matching whose graph contains
no trading cliques is acyclical.
A straightforward result then follows:
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Theorem 3.3. If matching M (Pareto) dominates matching M ′ , then the directed graph GM ′ of
M ′ admits a trading clique. Equivalently, if the directed graph of M ′ is acyclical, then M ′ is Pareto
efficient. Conversely, if M ′ admits a trading clique, we can always find a matching M which Pareto
dominates M ′ (equivalently, the directed graph of a Pareto efficient matching is acyclical).
Proof. Let M and M ′ be two matchings such that M (Pareto) dominates M ′ but the directed
graph of M ′ has no trading cliques. As M dominates M ′ , some students get strictly better off by
changing from M ′ to M . We draw a directed edge from each improved student to the student who
brought that school into the trade as his initial endowment. Since we assume that GM ′ does not
admit a clique, these edges cannot constitute a cycle. Hence there exists at least one student at
the end of a chain of such directed edges. This student then only gives out his endowment but is
not receiving any (better) school. This contradicts with the assumption of Pareto domination. 
Consider now the following procedure:
• Round 0: Given a preference and priority profile, run the SOSM algorithm and obtain a
temporary matching M0 .
• Round t, t ≥ 1: Given Mt−1 , consider the graph (Vt , Et , wt ) of Mt−1 . If there exists a
student with no path through him, remove that student from the graph; his assignment
under Mt will be his initial endowment at the beginning of this round. If there are any
trading cliques in the graph (Vt , Et ), pick one. For each edge from i to j in this clique, let
Mt be the matching that assigns student i the school to which j was matched under Mt−1 .
If there is no trading clique, return Mt−1 as the outcome Mt and stop.
We call this the Trading Adjusted Deferred Acceptance Mechanism (TADAM). Note that
adjusting student assignments by following a trading clique yields a Pareto improvement. Thus all
subsequent outcomes Pareto dominate the SOSM matching. Looking also at when the algorithm
stops we can in fact qualify the last assertion further and say that all outcomes of the TADAM are
Pareto efficient Pareto dominations of the initial SOSM matching.
As can be seen from the steps of the defining algorithm above, there may be several outcomes of
TADAM for a given problem. In particular in cases with multiple trading cliques the process may
output different matchings depending on which cycles are selected at rounds t ≥ 1. This will be
clearer when we look at concrete examples, which we do next.
We begin with an example where the preference and priority structures are strict.17 Consider once
again SCP2 (§§2.2) with five students and five schools each with one seat:

SCP2 :

i1
i2
i3
i4
i5

: s2
: s2
: s5
: s4
: s5

≻ s5
≻ s5
≻ s2
≻ s1
≻ s4

≻ s4
≻ s4
≻ s1
≻ s2
≻ s2

≻ s3
≻ s1
≻ s3
≻ s3
≻ s3

≻ s1
≻ s3
≻ s4
≻ s5
≻ s1

s1
s2
s3
s4
s5

: i3
: i4
: i2
: i1
: i1

≻ i2
≻ i5
≻ i3
≻ i2
≻ i2

≻ i4
≻ i1
≻ i4
≻ i3
≻ i5

≻ i1
≻ i2
≻ i5
≻ i5
≻ i3

≻ i5
≻ i3
≻ i1
≻ i4
≻ i4

The matching under SOSM is:
MSSCP2

=




i1 i2 i3 i4 i5
,
s5 s4 s1 s2 s3

and has preference index 10. SOSM does a poor job with student preferences here. One student
gets his fourth choice, three get their third choice and one gets his second choice.
17In such a situation, the weight function on the graph is uniformly 1 and can be ignored.
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For SCP2 , the associated SOSM matching can thus be translated into the following graph.
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We see that if there is an arrow from il to ij then il would (weakly) prefer to be assigned to M [ij ].
Such a swap can only be allowed if another student, ik , prefers M [il ] to his own assignment, that is,
only if there is a directed edge from some vik to vil . In this manner, a group of students can form
a “swap market” and they can trade their SOSM assignments among themselves consistent with
the directed graph. Such a “swap market” would correspond to a cycle in the graph. Here are four
different trading cliques within the directed graph above (cliques denoted by unbroken arrows):
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We list the assignments corresponding to each of the four cliques:
i1
i2
M1 = i3
i4
i5

: s2
: s2
: s5
: s4
: s5

≻ s5
≻ s5
≻ s2
≻ s1
≻ s4

≻ s4
≻ s4
≻ s1
≻ s2
≻ s2

≻ s3
≻ s1
≻ s3
≻ s3
≻ s3

≻ s1
≻ s3
≻ s4
≻ s5
≻ s1

i1 : s2 ≻ s5 ≻ s4 ≻ s3 ≻ s1
i2 : s2 ≻ s5 ≻ s4 ≻ s1 ≻ s3
M2 = i3 :: s5 ≻ s2 ≻ s1 ≻ s3 ≻ s4
i4 : s4 ≻ s1 ≻ s2 ≻ s3 ≻ s5
i5 : s5 ≻ s4 ≻ s2 ≻ s3 ≻ s1

i1
i2
M3 = i3
i4
i5

: s2
: s2
: s5
: s4
: s5

≻ s5
≻ s5
≻ s2
≻ s1
≻ s4

≻ s4
≻ s4
≻ s1
≻ s2
≻ s2

≻ s3
≻ s1
≻ s3
≻ s3
≻ s3

≻ s1
≻ s3
≻ s4
≻ s5
≻ s1

i1
i2
M4 = i3
i4
i5
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: s2
: s2
: s5
: s4
: s5

≻ s5
≻ s5
≻ s2
≻ s1
≻ s4

≻ s4
≻ s4
≻ s1
≻ s2
≻ s2

≻ s3
≻ s1
≻ s3
≻ s3
≻ s3

≻ s1
≻ s3
≻ s4
≻ s5
≻ s1

Observe that matchings 1, 3, and 4 are Pareto efficient but matching 2 is not. In fact, if we draw
the directed graph of matching 2, we see that there is another cycle between i3 and i1 . Thus we
could continue with another clique, which would result in matching 1.
The preference reverence index for all three efficient matchings is 6. This raises the question of
what efficient matching should be chosen in case of multiple efficient matchings. In this specific
example, all three matchings give two students their top choice, one student her second choice,
one student her third choice, and one student her fourth choice. Note that matching 4 is the one
obtained earlier via EADAM with the consent of i5 and, equivalently, via a coalition with the cabal
K = {i1 , i2 , i4 } (the cabal loop is (i1 → i4 → i2 → i1 )), the accomplice set A(K) = {i5 }, and the
set X = {s2 , s4 } for i5 (cf. §§2.2). We also saw in §§2.5 that this is exactly the TTC outcome.
Note that in all these cases, i5 ’s assignment stays the same, i.e., i5 is a hopeless student a la §§2.3.
Looking at the graph, we see that there is no path passing through i5 ; there is no chance for his
situation to be improved. We can simplify the graph by taking out the vertex corresponding to i5 .
Let us look now at SCP3 (§2.4) and see what TADAM would yield in that situation. Recall that
the preference and priority profiles were as follows::

SCP3 :

i1
i2
i3
i4
i5

: s1
: s2
: s5
: s4
: s5

≻ s2
≻ s5
≻ s2
≻ s1
≻ s4

≻ s5
≻ s4
≻ s1
≻ s2
≻ s2

≻ s4
≻ s1
≻ s3
≻ s3
≻ s3

≻ s3
≻ s3
≻ s4
≻ s5
≻ s1

s1
s2
s3
s4
s5

: i3
: i4
: i2
: i1
: i1

≻ i2
≻ i5
≻ i3
≻ i2
≻ i2

≻ i4
≻ i1
≻ i4
≻ i3
≻ i5

≻ i1
≻ i2
≻ i5
≻ i5
≻ i3

≻ i5
≻ i3
≻ i1
≻ i4
≻ i4

The SOSM matching for this problem was:
MSSCP3

=



i1 i2 i3 i4 i5
s5 s4 s1 s2 s3



and had preference index 11. We begin by drawing the directed graph of this matching:
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This looks very similar to the directed graph of SCP2 ; the only difference is that the edge between
vi1 and vi3 is double sided. Once again no path goes through vi5 . Therefore the trading cliques
afforded by SCP3 will be all the trading cliques afforded by SCP2 , with the addition of the following:
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The improved matchings associated to these are:
i1
i2
M1 = i3
i4
i5

: s1
: s2
: s5
: s4
: s5

≻ s2
≻ s5
≻ s2
≻ s1
≻ s4

≻ s5
≻ s4
≻ s1
≻ s2
≻ s2

≻ s4
≻ s1
≻ s3
≻ s3
≻ s3

≻ s3
≻ s3
≻ s4
≻ s5
≻ s1

i1 : s1 ≻ s2 ≻ s5 ≻ s4 ≻ s3
i2 : s2 ≻ s5 ≻ s4 ≻ s1 ≻ s3
M2 = i3 :: s5 ≻ s2 ≻ s1 ≻ s3 ≻ s4
i4 : s4 ≻ s1 ≻ s2 ≻ s3 ≻ s5
i5 : s5 ≻ s4 ≻ s2 ≻ s3 ≻ s1

i1
i2
M3 = i3
i4
i5

: s1
: s2
: s5
: s4
: s5

≻ s2
≻ s5
≻ s2
≻ s1
≻ s4

≻ s5
≻ s4
≻ s1
≻ s2
≻ s2

≻ s4
≻ s1
≻ s3
≻ s3
≻ s3

≻ s3
≻ s3
≻ s4
≻ s5
≻ s1

i1
i2
M4 = i3
i4
i5

: s1
: s2
: s5
: s4
: s5

≻ s2
≻ s5
≻ s2
≻ s1
≻ s4

≻ s5
≻ s4
≻ s1
≻ s2
≻ s2

≻ s4
≻ s1
≻ s3
≻ s3
≻ s3

≻ s3
≻ s3
≻ s4
≻ s5
≻ s1

i1 : s1 ≻ s2 ≻ s5 ≻ s4 ≻ s3
i1 : s1 ≻ s2 ≻ s5 ≻ s4 ≻ s3
i2 : s2 ≻ s5 ≻ s4 ≻ s1 ≻ s3
i2 : s2 ≻ s5 ≻ s4 ≻ s1 ≻ s3
M5 = i3 : s5 ≻ s2 ≻ s1 ≻ s3 ≻ s4
M6 = i3 : s5 ≻ s2 ≻ s1 ≻ s3 ≻ s4
i4 : s4 ≻ s1 ≻ s2 ≻ s3 ≻ s5
i4 : s4 ≻ s1 ≻ s2 ≻ s3 ≻ s5
i5 : s5 ≻ s4 ≻ s2 ≻ s3 ≻ s1
i5 : s5 ≻ s4 ≻ s2 ≻ s3 ≻ s1
with preference indices 7, 9, 7, 7, 7, and 5, respectively. Note that none of these matchings is
efficient. In other words if we run the TADAM algorithm for this problem, no matter which
trading clique is picked at Round 1, we will be able to find a second trading clique to continue the
process. For instance the directed graph for M6 contains a single two-sided edge between vi2 and
vi3 , and three unrequited edges coming out of vi5 :

vi 5

))

; vi 1
vv
v
vv
vv
v
v
))
)

))
)

))




vi 4


 

/ vi
J 2
 


vi 3

which yields a single trading clique between i2 and i3 . Applying the TADAM algorithm one round
further, we get the effective matching:


i i i i i
MESCP3 = 1 2 3 4 5
s1 s2 s5 s4 s3
with preference index 3. This is precisely the same matching as found by EADAM with full consent
or alternatively with the coalition described in §§2.4.
3.2. Properties of TADAM. We begin this section with an analysis of the performance of
TADAM under strategic action. We first state a key result from [17]:
Proposition 3.4 (Prop.4 in [17]). No Pareto efficient mechanism that can Pareto improve upon
SOSM is fully immune to strategic action.
Since TADAM produces Pareto improvements of SOSM, it follows then that it is not strategyproof. This is consistent with other improvements upon SOSM. However, lack of strategy-proofness
does not imply easy manipulability. The feasibility of manipulation decreases as the size of the market (school district) increases. This is analogous to our earlier assertion that substantial coalitions
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are hard to form naturally on their own in the context of SCP. Students do not have complete information about preference profiles of other students, so potential profitable strategic behaviors are
highly unlikely. Formulating an alternative ranked list which yields a better assignment, even with
complete information on all other students will most likely not be feasible for individual students.
Making the above more precise in technical language we first split the schools into categories in
terms of perceived quality. Then we can prove (cf. Theorem 2 of [17], see Appendix):
Theorem 3.5. Let the set of schools S be partitioned into categories of perceived quality:
S = S1 ∪ S2 ∪ · · · ∪ Sm ,

such that

Si ∩ Sj = ∅ if i 6= j,

such that for any k, l ∈ {1, · · · , m} with k < l, each student prefers any school in Sk to any school
in Sl . Let each student’s information be symmetric for any two schools in the same perceived
quality category. Then for any student the strategy of truth telling stochastically dominates any
other strategy when other students behave truthfully. Thus truth telling is an ordinal Bayesian
Nash equilibrium of the preference revelation game under TADAM.
A well-studied method of strategic action by students is truncation manipulation, one of the few
tools available in such a largely incomplete information matching game [9]. However it is easy to
see that in TADAM no student benefits from truncating her preference list; any such truncation
results in fewer cliques and fewer opportunities for that student (and for others) to improve her lot.
Note also that TADAM is group strategyproof because every possible Pareto improvement has
been made and no possible coalition can be formed.
Another prominent feature of TADAM is its efficiency. Each trading clique followed improves the
efficiency of the outcome, neutralizing to an extent the inefficiency caused by SOSM. As each such
improvement creates a Pareto domination of the previous matching and decreases the preference
reverence index, at the end of the algorithm, we stop at a Pareto efficient matching. In fact TADAM
produces all efficient matchings that Pareto dominate SOSM. We prove a slightly stronger result:
Proposition 3.6. If matching M (Pareto) dominates the SOSM matching, M ∗ , then M is realizable by TADAM up to null cliques.
Proof. Let E ⊆ I be the subset of students assigned to different schools under M and M ∗ . For
each element i ∈ E, denote by πE (i) the student i∗ with M ∗ [i∗ ] = M [i]; πE (i) is the student whose
SOSM assignment is assigned to i via the new matching. Note that πE is a permutation on E.
[Recall again the fact that permutations are products of disjoint cycles (cf. proof of Theorem 2.8).]
Theorem 3.3 implies that M ∗ admits a trading clique; we want to make sure we will be aiming for
M . To this goal, we use the following steps to identify which cliques should be used in TADAM:
• Step 1: Pick a student i ∈ E and label her i1,1 . Then let i1,2 be the student πE (i1,1 ) and
more generally label i1,j+1 = πE (i1,j ). This process will stop at some j1 with πE (i1,j1 ) = i1,1
as πE is a finite permutation. Then E1 = (i1,1 , i1,2 , · · · , i1,j1 ) is a clique.
And in general,
• Step k, k ≥ 1: Pick a student i ∈ E who has not yet been assigned to a cabal loop and
label her ik,1 . If none exists then the algorithm stops. Otherwise, label πE (ik,1 ) as ik,2 and
more generally label ik,j+1 = πE (ik,j ). This process stops at some jk with πE (ik,jk ) = ik,1
as πE is finite. Then Ek = (ik,1 , ik,2 , · · · , ik,jk , ik,1 ) is a clique.
The process has to stop since E is finite. Furthermore each student in E shows up in exactly one
step and hence in exactly one clique, because πE is invertible. Note that at least one of the cliques
is not null (in other words at least one of the cliques is a trading clique) because for M to Pareto
dominate M ∗ , at least one student must strictly prefer her M -assignment to her M ∗ -assignment;
this gives us an edge with weight 1. Then to obtain M from M ∗ via TADAM we run TADAM using
the trading cliques we have found above, and finally modify with the null cliques remaining.
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Obviously, distinct Pareto efficient matchings are Pareto incomparable. At this point we might
resort to another evaluative criterion. For instance we may wish to then consider the matchings
with minimal preference index; this can reduce our option size.
The above proposition easily yields the following:
Corollary 3.7. All efficient outcomes of EADAM and CIM can be found by TADAM.
Proof. This follows immediately from the previous proposition and noting that EADAM and CIM
(Pareto) dominate SOSM.

Recall that both EADAM and coalitional improvements provide us with one way to improve
SOSM. However, TADAM can return all Pareto efficient matchings that dominate SOSM so that
we can compare all choices and pick the most desirable matching.
Note that since TADAM outcomes are always Pareto improvements on the SOSM baseline, TTC
outcomes may not always be reachable via TADAM. This is because in some cases (e.g., SCP4 ,
SCP5 ) the TTC outcome is Pareto incomparable to the SOSM outcome. Compare with §§2.5.
The absolute efficiency of TADAM may appeal to a utilitarian. However, this efficiency is achieved
at the expense of stability. Clearly TADAM is not stable; just like TTC, TADAM trades stability
for efficiency. Obviously we need to make an effort to coordinate the tradeoff between stability and
efficiency. In the school choice literature, “fairness”, “stability”, “justified envy”, and “no priority
violation” are often used interchangeably. Here we propose a more nuanced notion of fairness.
Since TADAM starts with the SOSM outcome as input, we are starting at a point where student
priorities are considered and respected. TADAM may then make changes to the assignments which
cause instability, manifesting itself in terms of justified envy. However, if a student’s assigned
school could not get any better under any stable mechanism, we surmise that his “justified envy”
for anybody’s assignment should not be justified. To formalize this we make the
Definition 3.8. A matching is reasonably fair if there is no stable matching that can improve the
assignment of any student. A mechanism is reasonably fair if it always outputs reasonably fair
matchings.
Then the following is a direct consequence:
Proposition 3.9. TADAM is a reasonably fair mechanism.
Finally note that indifferences in student preferences are seamlessly incorporated into the cliques
model (via the weights on our graph). This makes our model a versatile theoretical tool for further
investigations in the SCP. Consider for instance the simple SCP below:
SCP6 :

i1 : s1 = s2 ≻ s3
i2 : s1 ≻ s2 ≻ s3
i3 : s1 ≻ s2 ≻ s3

s1 : i1 ≻ i3 ≻ i2
s2 : i2 ≻ i1 ≻ i3
s3 : i2 ≻ i1 ≻ i3

where we denote indifference by =. When we run the SOSM we need to break the tie in student
i1 ’s preferences, so in one such tie-breaking step, the resulting problem equals SCP1 :
SCP1 :

i1 : s2 ≻ s1 ≻ s3
i2 : s1 ≻ s2 ≻ s3
i3 : s1 ≻ s2 ≻ s3

s1 : i1 ≻ i3 ≻ i2
s2 : i2 ≻ i1 ≻ i3
s3 : i2 ≻ i1 ≻ i3

Then the SOSM outcome is
MSSCP6

=




i1 i2 i3
,
s1 s2 s3
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TADAM allows us to create a trading clique between i1 and i2 , resulting in a more optimal outcome:


i i i
MTSCP6 = 1 2 3 .
s2 s1 s3
This outcome has lower preference index (2 as opposed to 3) and is efficient.
Although a considerable amount of research has been done regarding indifferences within school
priority classes, indifference in student preferences has not been closely considered. As far as we
know, our work here provides the first cycle improvement model applied to the SCP that explicitly
takes into account student preference indifferences. We intend to follow this path of inquiry further
in future work. For indifferences in the context of the stable marriage problem, see [16], [19].
4. Conclusion
In this paper, we introduce and investigate the properties of coalitions and cliques, two notions
that can be incorporated into a school choice mechanism to improve the efficiency of SOSM. While
“coalitions” and “cliques” might seem semantically indistinguishable, we believe the two perspectives provide different insights about cyclic improvements.
Coalitions present an opportunity for ex-ante efficiency gains upon SOSM. By effectively ignoring
irrelevant preferences under SOSM, we allow for maximum gains for students under SOSM. Since
matching students under SOSM in the presence of interruptors hinders efficiency, we effectively
prevent students’ preferences from unnecessarily conflicting with each other.
Conversely, the notion of trading cliques presents an opportunity for ex-post efficiency gains
upon SOSM. More specifically, TADAM realizes all possible efficiency gains that allow mutually
beneficial trade. Since matching students under SOSM guarantees students the best matching they
could have received under a stable mechanism, we attempt to improve upon this baseline to provide
students with an optimal matching. Fortunately, TADAM allows the policy maker to decide which
improvement is most desirable, given their socially relevant circumstances.
Our work may also be viewed as a fresh examination of three well-known and widely used school
choice mechanisms (SOSM, TTC, and EADAM) each of which has well-understood strengths and
weaknesses. Our view throughout is that strict adherence to stability at the cost of student preference optimization is less than ideal and can be overcome by considering new criteria for evaluation
and/or different justifications for sacrificing stability. Our introduction of the notion of “reasonably fair” captures this alternate focus on improving outcomes for students without bowing to the
pressures of perceived unfairness. The double meaning of reasonableness as “somewhat” as well
as “what a reasonable person would accept” is especially apropos. The constructions here yield
opportunities to improve upon these mechanisms while justifying resulting priority violations in
new ways.
The first improvement presented here involves the creation of cheating coalitions to improve on
SOSM, analogous to the use of such cheating coalitions in the stable marriage problem. We show
that using coalitions, we can obtain the same outcome as EADAM, with full consent. Because the
creation of cheating coalitions requires complete knowledge of all preference profiles, it suggests the
idea that school districts explore all possible outcomes of coalition cheating in order to establish
the best overall matching in terms of student preferences as well as school priorities. This sets up
the notion of school districts as “co-conspirators” with the additional position of benevolence in
the sense of wanting the best outcome for all students in contrast to the assumed selfish goal of
individual students. The priority violations that arise as a result of EADAM (and other coalition
cheating outcomes) are better justified in this context as the overall process seeking the best outcome
for most. Students would not have to be asked to waive priorities because the investigation of
outcomes resulting from cheating coalitions would be considered part of the overall mechanism.
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Since the cheating coalitions (as with EADAM) do not result in any students receiving a worse
matching than they would have in any case, the objections should be minimized.
Our second approach to improving upon SOSM involves the introduction of trading cliques. This
process produces all possible Pareto efficient matchings that Pareto dominate SOSM. The improvement cycles used do not result in any student being matched to a lower preference school and do not
require students to waive their (perceived) priorities. Again, in this context, the examination of all
outcomes that result from applying trading cliques to the outcomes of SOSM would be considered
as part of the mechanism, applied by the district (Mechanism Designer), and thus the priority
violations would be more fully justified. While there already exists a mechanism (EADAM [17])
which finds one Pareto efficient, Pareto domination of the popular deferred acceptance mechanism
(SOSM [2]), TADAM finds all possible Pareto dominations of SOSM. This mechanism affords policy makers the luxury of comparing all available Pareto improvements of SOSM. In addition, recall
that TADAM produces, among its matchings, the EADAM matching (with full consent). Because
TADAM is easier to run and explain than EADAM, we contend that it is a preferable way to obtain
that matching. Moreover, families do not have to waive priorities in the context of TADAM.
Clearly our two modifications work by Pareto improving the baseline outcome of SOSM. Since
no student is ever matched to a lower ranked school than SOSM, the objections to the followup
process should be minimized. Starting with SOSM as a basis is useful because it is a mechanism
that is currently in use. Thus these improvements can have genuine practical implications. We can
justify the priority violations that result from coalition cheating and trading cliques by showing
that the new assignments (Pareto) dominate the SOSM assignments. Because many of the current
school priorities in place are meant to create some certainty/security for families, once those have
been taken into account in the initial assignment, and since we can demonstrate that no families
are made worse off, neither schools nor families should have a reason to object.
As a final note we point out that in fact the two notions introduced in this paper are related. More
specifically given a coalition C = (K, A(K)) in the notation of §§2.2, we can always construct a
sequence of trading cliques that under TADAM yields the same outcome. In other words coalitional
outcomes can always be obtained via TADAM as well. Going the other way is also doable in
the case of strict preference profiles: any clique in such a context corresponds to a cabal cycle
and the accomplices may be determined afterwards by looking at the resulting priority violations.
Nonetheless, even though the two threads of this work lead us to almost equivalent end points, we
believe that their separate (but connected) treatment may encourage a more nuanced discussion.
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Appendix A. Proof of Theorem 3.5
A.1. Background and notation. In the following, we describe, in our notation, the precise formal
setting of Kesten’s Apprendices E-F [17], which in turn follow [9] and [22].
Recall from §§1.1 that we denote a set consisting of preference profiles for each student in I by
P = {Pi : i ∈ I} and a set consisting of priority structures for each school in S by Π = {Πs : s ∈ S}.
We also denoted the space of all sets P, and the space of all sets Π, by P and , respectively.
In the following we will also need to introduce the notation Pi , which stands for the class of all
possible preference listings for student i. Set
def

X−i =  × {Pi′ }i′ 6=i .
Following Kesten we define a random school choice problem (RSCP) to be a probability distribution P̂−i over X−i , which is intended to denote student i’s belief about the preference lists
submitted by the rest of the students together with the priority structures given for all the schools.
Analogously we define a random matching M̂ to be a probability distribution over the set M of
all matchings. Given a matching mechanism M and a SCP (Pi , P−i ), where P−i ∈ X−i , M(Pi , P−i )
will stand for the matching selected by M for this problem.
Now given a mechanism M, and a student i with preference Pi , each RSCP P̂−i induces a random
matching M(Pi , P̂−i ) in the following manner: For M ∈ M, set the probability P r(M(Pi , P̂−i ) =
M ) that the mechanism outputs matching M for the setup at hand equal to the probability that
P̂−i = P−i and M(Pi , P−i ) = M . Finally define M(Pi , P̂−i )[i] to be the distribution that this
random matching induces over student i’s set of placements.
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We will say that, given a student i, her true preference list Pi , and two strategies (declared
preference lists) Pi′ , Pi′′ for i, strategy Pi′ stochastically dominates Pi′′ if the probability distribution induced on the placements of student i when she declares Pi′ stochastically dominates the
probability distribution induced when she declares Pi′′ , where we base the comparison on her true
preference list Pi . More precisely, given student i ∈ I, preference lists Pi , Pi′ , Pi′′ ∈ Pi , and a RSCP
P̂−i , strategy Pi′ stochastically Pi -dominates strategy Pi′′ if for all s ∈ S, the probability that
i will be assigned by the mechanism to a school that (according to her true preference list Pi ) she
prefers over s when she submits the preference list Pi′ is greater than or equal to the probability of
the same happening when she submits the list Pi′′ .
So let us now be given a SCP of the form (P, Π) = ({Pi : i ∈ I}, {Πs , s ∈ S}. Let the set of schools
S be partitioned into categories of perceived quality (“communal perceived quality classes”):
S = S1 ∪ S2 ∪ · · · ∪ Sm ,

such that

Si ∩ Sj = ∅ if i 6= j,

where all students prefer any school in Sk to any school in Sl , for any k, l ∈ {1, · · · , m} with k < l.
A.2. Symmetry, anonymity, and positive association. If a student cannot distinguish between two schools s, s′ in terms of how other students rank them, then we say that she has symmetric information about the two schools. In the setting above where students all agree on the
perceived quality categories of schools, the additional assumption of symmetry is quite reasonable,
especially in the context of larger school districts.18 So we assume that each student’s information
be symmetric for any two schools in the same perceived quality category. To show that for any student the strategy of truth telling stochastically dominates any other strategy when other students
behave truthfully, we refer to Ehlers’ two conditions: anonymity and positive association [9].
To define these three terms precisely, we need some more notation first.
′
Given a matching M ∈ M, and s, s′ ∈ S, denote by M s↔s denote the matching that switches the
assignments of the schools s and s′ . In other words,

s↔s′ [i] 6= s or s′

M [i] if M
′
M s↔s [i] = s′
if M [i] = s


s
if M [i] = s′ .
′

Similarly we can define Pis↔s to be the preference list for i obtained from Pi by switching the
s↔s′ ∈ X
order of s and s′ while leaving all the other rankings fixed. In this same scenario, P−i
−i will
denote the complementary profile for i, where each student i′ 6= i switches the positions of s and s′
in his preference list, and the two schools s and s′ switch with one another their capacity and their
priorities: Πs becomes the new priority for s′ while Πs′ is the new priority structure for s.
Finally we can make the following
Definition A.1. For student i ∈ I and schools s, s′ ∈ S, i’s information on s and s′ is symmetric
s↔s′
s↔s′ are equally probable; i.e., P r(P̂
if P−i and P−i
−i = P−i ) = P r(P̂−i = P−i ). i has completely
symmetric information if i has symmetric information on s and s′ for any pair s, s′ ∈ S.
Definition A.2. A mechanism M is said to satisfy anonymity if for any student i ∈ I, Pi ∈ Pi ,
′
s↔s′ ) = M s↔s′ .
P−i ∈ X−i , and s, s′ ∈ S, whenever M(Pi , P−i ) = M , we have M(Pis↔s , P−i

Definition A.3. A mechanism M is said to satisfy positive association if for any student i ∈ I,
Pi ∈ Pi , P−i ∈ X−i , and s, s′ ∈ S, whenever M(Pi , P−i )[i] = s and i prefers s′ to s under the
′
preference list Pi , we have M(Pis↔s , P−i )[i] = s.
18Following Kesten’s Footnote 27, we add another condition: Two schools assumed to be symmetric also have

similar capacities. Variances in capacity may cause strategizing among groups of students, and may break the
symmetry.
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In intuitive language symmetric information means that student i cannot see any difference
between the two schools with respect to their priorities and the remaining student preferences.
Anonymity basically says that the mechanism treats schools equally. Positive association implies
that if a student decides to report a higher ranking for a school he is to be placed into in one
particular problem, the mechanism will not modify his assignment.
Ehlers [9] proves that DA/SOSM mechanism satisfies both conditions of anonymity and positive
association. Kesten [17] extends these ideas to show that, under the assumption of symmetric
information, EADAM also satisfies both conditions. It is clear that TADAM also satisfies the
anonymity condition. In the next section we will see that it also displays the positive association
property. Theorem 3.5 will then follow as a simple application of Ehlers’ Theorem 3.1. Below we
translate the latter result into the school choice context and present this as:
Theorem A.4 (Ehlers [9]). Let M ∈ M be an anonymous mechanism with positive association.
(a) If a student has symmetric information for schools s, s′ , any strategy that reverses the true
ranking of s and s′ is stochastically dominated by a strategy that preserves the true ranking
of s and s′ ; and
(b) If a student has completely symmetric information, any strategy that changes her true ranking of the schools is stochastically dominated by a strategy that preserves their true ranking.
As direct corollaries of the proof [cf. Kesten [17, Prop.A.1]], we obtain two results:
Corollary A.5. Let M ∈ M be an anonymous mechanism with positive association. If student i
has symmetric information for all schools in S ′ ⊂ S, any strategy that changes her true ranking of
schools in S ′ and reflects her true preferences for s ∈ S\S ′ is stochastically dominated by a strategy
that preserves the true rankings for all schools in S.
Corollary A.6. Let M ∈ M be an anonymous mechanism with positive association. If student
i has true preference Pi and information P̂−i under the conditions of Theorem 3.5, strategy Pi
stochastically dominates any other strategy ranking schools in Sk above schools in Sl for all k < l.
A.3. TADAM and positive association. In order to show that TADAM satisfies positive association, we will first prove:
Proposition A.7. In the setup of Theorem 3.5, any trading clique formed at any stage of TADAM
consists only of schools within the same class of perceived quality.
Proof. Let (i1 , i2 , · · · , in ) be a trading clique formed at stage t of TADAM. Without loss of generality
assume that w(ei1 ,i2 ) = 1, Mt−1 [i1 ] = s1 , Mt−1 [i2 ] = s2 , s1 ∈ Sk1 . If s2 ∈ Sk2 for some k2 , then
we must have k2 ≤ k1 because s2 ≻i1 s1 . Similarly we can show that, for all r ∈ {2, · · · , n},
the communal perceived quality of school Mt−1 [ir ] must be ranked higher than or the same as
the communal perceived quality of school Mt−1 [ir−1 ]. More precisely, if we define kr ∈ N for
r ∈ {2, · · · , n} so that Mt−1 [ir ] ∈ Skr , we must have kr ≤ kr−1 for all r. But this will carry
over to the end of the loop, so we also have k1 ≤ kn . As N is well-ordered, we need to have
k1 = k2 = · · · = kn to avoid inconsistency. This completes the proof.

A direct corollary adapts Kesten’s Lemma A.3 to TADAM:
Corollary A.8. In the setup of Theorem 3.5, TADAM places each student to a school whose
communal perceived quality class is the same as her DA/SOSM assignment.
Now we finally prove that TADAM satisfies positive association. Let i ∈ I be an arbitrary student.
Let Pi ∈ Pi , P−i ∈ X−i , and s, s′ ∈ S be such that TADAM assigns i to s when the input problem
is (Pi , P−i ). Assume further that i prefers s′ to s under the preference list Pi . We need to show
′
that if i reports preference Pis↔s instead, TADAM will not change her assignment.
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First of all we note that if student i is not involved in any trading clique in the original problem
(Pi , P−i ), she is assigned to s in the step 0 run of DA/SOSM, and her changed profile will not affect
her DA/SOSM outcome (as DA/SOSM satisfies positive association). Since in this new profile,
she assigns a higher rank to s, she will not be in any new trading cliques (the graph obtained at
this stage will be a proper subgraph of the original). So let us assume that student i is part of a
trading clique at step t of TADAM running for the problem (Pi , P−i ); without loss of generality we
can assume that t is the smallest such. Then this means that at this stage i trades her DA/SOSM
assignment, sDA,SOSM , for the problem (Pi , P−i ). Then it is clear that s i sDA/SOSM according
to her true preference profile Pi . But since according to Pi , s′ is even more preferable, we have
′
s′ i sDA/SOSM as well. So if she reports Pis↔s , the directed graph formed after the first run of
DA/SOSM at step 0 of TADAM will have exactly the same edges as before. However since in the
original problem she was assigned to s by TADAM, she was never in any clique that resulted in her
assignment being switched to anything better than s (from the perspective of Pi ). If she reports
′
Pis↔s , and we look at the whole run of TADAM, we can therefore see that she will once again not
be in any new cliques, in particular the schools that are now ranked below s but above s′ will still
not be involved in any cliques. When all is said and done, she will once again be in the same cliques
(all with outcomes resulting in i being assigned to schools that are now ranked below s′ , until the
clique which involves her getting assigned to s). 
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